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I. INTRODUCTION 
Becoming an expert in a complex scientific field 
like physics means more than mastering a vocabulary, 
learning facts, developing skill with mathematical 
tools, or even developing the ability to carry out scien-
tific discourse.  Although these are necessary compo-
nents of learning to be a scientist, the critical element 
of any science is creating new knowledge – learning 
what types of knowledge count as proof (i.e. the ways 
we decide we know something in a particular disci-
pline).  In physics, or in any scientific field that uses 
mathematics heavily, a variety of epistemologically 
distinct reasonings (that is, proof-making strategies) 
may be brought to bear including: mathematical calcu-
lation, mapping physical meaning into mathematics, 
citing authoritative sources, and seeking mathematical 
consistency, among others.
1
  As a result, developing 
epistemological sophistication is a critical element of 
becoming a professional scientist.  This paper’s goal is 
to detail what we mean by “epistemological sophisti-
cation”.  
In previous papers
1,2,3
 we have demonstrated that in 
all classes at the university level, students can “get 
stuck” in particular modes of constructing knowledge, 
using a limited set of the knowledge they possess 
while ignoring other things they know well that would 
have helped them significantly in making progress to a 
solution.  We argue here that although this can occur at 
all levels (even with professionals), a critical part of 
the novice to expert transition in physics is learning to 
integrate different kinds of knowledge in the solution 
of a problem.  This is particularly important at what 
we refer to as the journeyman level – that level where 
students have developed sufficient skills that they can 
no longer be considered novices but where they have 
not yet had sufficient experience with sophisticated 
problem solving (and research) to be considered ex-
perts.  For most students, we intend this stage to corre-
spond to the upper division and early graduate level. 
Typically, we expect the kind of epistemological 
development described here occurs as a tacit part of 
our upper division and graduate instruction in physics 
– an element of the hidden curriculum of upper divi-
sion physics.  Experts may automatically reach for a 
variety of epistemic tools and take their integration for 
granted, and upper division instructors may not realize 
the nature of the difficulty their students are having.  
We have often heard colleagues complain that their 
students “don’t know enough math”, despite having 
successfully passed (and even done well in) the rele-
vant formal math classes.  In our experience, many of 
these apparent “difficulties with math” are difficulties 
with juggling and integrating the various mathematical 
lenses available– epistemological difficulties of not 
knowing which elements of their mathematical knowl-
edge to call on in particular situations. 
We suggest that for many students and instructors, 
making these issues of epistemological sophistication 
explicit may be productive in creating upper division 
instruction that is effective for a larger fraction our 
physics majors. 
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In this paper we draw on our observational data-
base of students working on problems in upper divi-
sion physics.  In an attempt to explicate this epistemo-
logical sophistication we claim is vital to expertise, we 
present two case studies that show journeyman stu-
dents displaying it.  We discuss these case studies 
within the theoretical framework of resources
4,5,6
 and 
use the explicit terminology of epistemological re-
sources, epistemological framing, and warrants elabo-
rated in our previous paper.
1,
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Since this paper aims to detail this epistemological 
sophistication component of expertise in physics, we 
should briefly situate it within the (very large) body of 
literature about expertise in physics and problem solv-
ing.  The reader looking for more detail is urged to 
consult section 2.3 of Reference 7 (and the references 
therein).   
There are two broad perspectives on expertise.  
One is that experts behave like experts because they 
have larger stores of knowledge that are much more 
efficiently indexed than novices do.  See, for example, 
the classic study by Larkin et al.
8
  The other perspec-
tive holds that experts are better problem solvers be-
cause they are better in-the-moment navigators.  That 
is, they are better at evaluating their current progress 
in real time and appropriately adjusting their thought 
trajectories.  See, for example, Schoenfeld’s account 
of his problem-solving class.
9
   Our aim in this paper is 
to explicate what we see as a vital (and often underrep-
resented) part of expert physicists’ in-the-moment 
navigation during problem solving:  their epistemo-
logical sophistication.  
In section II, we briefly recap the theoretical 
framework and the language we have previously de-
veloped to describe the relevant epistemological issues 
in students’ thinking.  In section III, we describe the 
study from which our data is drawn, discuss our meth-
odology, and briefly review the results in our previous 
papers.   
In section IV we present the first of our case stud-
ies, in which two students solving a problem in quan-
tum physics admirably confront the epistemological 
implications of a mathematical exercise.  They nicely 
illustrate the fluid epistemological frame-switching we 
conjecture is an important component of expertise in 
physics. In section V, we present our second case 
study, in which an upper-level undergraduate attempts 
unsuccessfully to solve a problem in vector calculus, 
but again demonstrates a high level of epistemological 
sophistication.  He not only nimbly switches framings 
but also searches for coherence between them.  In sec-
tion VI, we state our conclusions and consider the im-
plications for instruction. 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. The Resource Framework 
In this work, as in our previous work, we are de-
veloping an ontology of student cognition in physics – 
a language to describe the elements of student thinking 
and reasoning in order to better understand the com-
ponents of the transition from novice to journeyman to 
expert.  To do this, we work within the Resource 
Framework (RF).  This is a theoretical structure for 
creating phenomenological models of high-level think-
ing based on a combination of core results selected 
from educational research phenomenology, cogni-
tive/neuroscience, and behavioral science.  It is a 
framework rather than a theory in that it provides on-
tologies (classes of structural elements and the way 
they behave) and it permits a range of possible struc-
tures and interactions built from these elements.   
The key element of the framework is that it focuses 
on small bits of knowledge,  resources, that can be 
activated and associated in a variety of context de-
pendent ways.  For this paper, the critical elements of 
the RF are that the activation of mental networks of 
associated elements is dynamic and that there are con-
trol structures.  The first means that the particular 
elements or networks of elements that are activated 
can change in response to new (external or internal) 
input.  The second means that there are elements in the 
structure that use partial information to control which 
elements and are activated and which are ignored. 
An extensive bibliography of papers developing 
and working within the RF is given on the website of 
the University of Maryland Physics Education Re-
search Group.
10
  (For more detail particularly relevant 
to this paper, see references 1, 5, and 6.) 
B. Epistemological Elements  
of the Framework 
One important component of the RF for this work 
is the identification of epistemological elements of a 
student’s knowledge structure.  By epistemology we 
mean the students’ knowledge about knowledge.  How 
do they decide what knowledge is relevant to bring to 
bear in solving a particular problem or component of a 
problem?  What counts as valid proof in this case?  
How do they decide something is known? 
Note that within the RF, when we talk about stu-
dent epistemologies we are not talking about their 
broad general beliefs about the nature of science.  
Rather, we are referring to their functional epistemolo-
gies (or “personal epistemologies”)
11, 12
 – how they 
decide they know in a particular context in a particular 
moment.  These functional epistemologies are often 
highly dynamic and labile.  Thus, we might ask a stu-
dent “whether well-established authoritative results are 
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important in science”, and they might respond “yes” or 
“no” and they may even do so in a reliable and repeat-
able manner.  But in solving a problem, a student may 
“choose” (consciously or unconsciously) either to 
simply quote a theorem or to rebuild that theorem, 
essentially recreating the proof, in order to see how the 
conditions of the theorem play out in a particular con-
text. 
These and other epistemological elements of 
knowledge structures in the RF have been developed 
in a series of papers by Hammer, Elby, Lising, Bing, 
and Redish.
11
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The three critical concepts for us 
here are warrants, epistemological resources, and 
epistemological framing.  The reader is encouraged to 
refer back to our previous paper
1
 for a more detailed 
development of these three critical concepts.   
We use the term warrant, borrowed from the rheto-
ric and argumentation theory literature,
14
 to focus on 
the epistemic content of a statement.  In rhetoric a war-
rant is a reason to believe, a connection between a 
claim and data given in support of that claim.  For ex-
ample, we might state that Johannes Gutenberg was 
the greatest inventor of the second millennium (claim) 
because he invented the movable-type method of print-
ing books (data). The relevant warrant that would link 
this data to that claim would be that movable type al-
lowed for the cheap mass distribution of printed mate-
rial, astronomically boosting the common citizen’s 
access to information and learning.  Warrants are often 
tacit, a part of the communal knowledge assumed in 
any conversation.
*
  In our study of student reasoning in 
upper division physics, we found that students often 
explicated their warrants when in a situation where 
there was a disagreement or a challenge.  Our focus on 
these articulated warrants allowed us to begin to de-
velop a classification scheme. 
 In our observation of many warrants articulated in 
our study, we found that they could be classified under 
a variety of general statements that we refer to as epis-
temological resources.
11,12,13
 In our previous study
1
 we 
identified four epistemological resources:  
Calculation – algorithmically following a set of es-
tablished computational steps should lead to a trustable 
result.  
Physical Mapping – a mathematical symbolic rep-
resentation faithfully characterizes some feature of the 
                                                
* A warrant is indeed a function of assumed community knowledge.  
If, in our previous example we could assume that our listeners all 
accepted the idea that “boosting the common citizen’s access to 
information and learning” was of primary importance, we are done.  
If that community does not all accept that idea, it becomes a claim 
and we have to come up with new data and a new warrant.  It is the 
level of common communal agreement assumed that prevents the 
claim/data/warrant chain from iterating ad infinitum. See L. Carroll, 
“What the tortoise said to Achilles,” Mind 4(14) 278-280 (1895). 
physical or geometric system it is intended to repre-
sent.  
Invoking Authority – information that comes from 
an authoritative source can be trusted. 
Mathematical Consistency – mathematics and 
mathematical manipulations have a regularity and reli-
ability and are consistent across different situations. 
We found most of the explicit warrants used by 
students in conflict or challenge situations fit one of 
these categories.  This is not meant to be an exclusive 
list. 
The third term we use in describing students’ func-
tional epistemological stances is epistemological fram-
ing.  This refers to the assumption in the RF that there 
is a control process asking the question, “What is it 
that’s going on here?”
15
 
16
  This process certainly oc-
curs at the beginning of any activity and, although it 
may result in the individual activating resources that 
govern an individual’s behavior for an extended time 
period, there is a continual dynamic checking process 
that can lead to a reframing of the activity.  For exam-
ple, a medical doctor on call attending a concert may 
be attentive to the music for many minutes until his 
pager (set on vibrate) redirects his attention.   Framing 
an activity includes many components including: so-
cial (Who will I interact with – and how?), artifacts 
(What materials will I use?), skills (What will I be 
doing here?), affect (How will I feel about what I’m 
doing?), and epistemology (How will I build new 
knowledge?).  For this work, we focus on epistemo-
logical framing – the judgments that are made (often 
implicitly) as to what knowledge is relevant to bring to 
bear in a particular situation. 
Note that the three terms “warrants”, “epistemo-
logical resources”, and “framing” are not intended to 
represent a strict, rigid decomposition of student activ-
ity. Rather, they represent emphases of different facets 
of what may appear a single unified cognitive activity, 
both to the individual making the statements and to the 
researcher.
17
 
III. THE STUDY 
A. Methodology 
The study from which the data for this paper was 
drawn was a part of a project to observe and analyze 
student thinking, in particular their use of mathemat-
ics, in upper division physics.
18
  We collected ap-
proximately 150 hours of video data of upper-level 
undergraduate physics students solving problems for 
such classes as Quantum Mechanics I and II, Interme-
diate Mechanics, Intermediate Electricity and Magnet-
ism, and Intermediate Mathematical Methods. Data 
involved both students working in groups on authentic 
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class problems and individual problem-solving inter-
views with problems set by the researchers.  
Our identification of the four common epistemo-
logical framings in our upper level physics students’ 
use of mathematics (i.e. Calculation, Physical Map-
ping, Invoking Authority, and Mathematical Consis-
tency) originally came from this data set.  We used an 
iterative methodology to identify these common fram-
ings, first describing the thinking of the students in a 
small subset of episodes and forming what generaliza-
tions we could.  We then tested these generalizations 
against a new subset of episodes, refining where nec-
essary.  Our four common framings and their descrip-
tions emerged after many such iterations.  The reader 
is encouraged to consult Reference 7 for a more de-
tailed methodological description (including details of 
an inter-rater reliability test for identifying these four 
framings). 
The two case studies chosen for this present paper 
were chosen because they stood out from the general 
data set in an interesting way.  In contrast to cases we 
have previously reported in which students appeared to 
“get stuck” in inappropriate epistemological frames, 
the students in these examples were seen to shift their 
epistemological framings very quickly, yet in a con-
trolled manner (that is, their fellow students and the 
interviewer had little trouble following their line of 
thinking).  These students appeared (at least in these 
moments) to be notably expert-like in their in-the-
moment navigation of their problem solving, and they 
are thus held up as prototypical examples of the “epis-
temological sophistication” we seek to develop in our 
students. We chose the cases in this paper in part be-
cause the students involved did not “get the problem 
right”.  The dissociation between mathematical cor-
rectness and epistemology illustrates our point that 
dynamic handling of epistemological framing is an 
independent strength of advanced journeymen. 
 
Intuition has many components: the identification 
of identity – to determine when things are supposed to 
represent the same thing (as in being able to follow 
formal proof); and the making of meaning – placing a 
problem in a broader context by linking to the many 
things we know about our subject and about the world. 
B. Recap of Previous Results:  
Getting stuck in an epistemological frame 
In our previous work
2,3,1
 we have given examples 
of students “getting stuck” in an epistemological fram-
ing that is inappropriate for solving the problem they 
are working on.  The result is that for many minutes 
they fail to bring to bear knowledge that they both 
know very well and that would have shown them their 
current approach was in error.  We briefly recap three 
examples here at three levels, referring the reader to 
the original publications for more detail. 
In their observations of novice physics students 
working homework problems in introductory college 
physics, Tuminaro and Redish
2
 observed a group of 
students solving an estimation problem near the end of 
the first semester.  The problem asked the students to 
“estimate the difference in atmospheric pressure be-
tween the floor and ceiling of your dorm room.”  Es-
timation problems had been a recurrent feature in both 
homework and exams through the term.  Yet despite 
the explicit terminology intended to cue an estimation 
framing, one student was observed leading her group 
through an activity that Tuminaro and Redish referred 
to as the “recursive plug-and-chug” epistemic game.
19
 
This activity is part of a framing that activates the 
epistemological resources of calculation and invoking 
authority.  The student identifies a target variable 
(pressure) and selects an equation from the book (PV 
= nRT).  The student makes explicit statements that 
clearly indicate that she believes that any numbers that 
she uses must come from authority and that, by impli-
cation, she may not construct them out of her own 
experience.  She also makes explicit statements that 
clearly indicate that she does not consider the physical 
meaning of either the equation chosen (she fails to 
distinguish pressure from change in pressure) or of the 
symbols in the equation (she first interprets “R” as “the 
radius” and is pleased when someone says, “no, it’s 
just a known constant”).  This inappropriately re-
stricted framing persists for many minutes and she is 
explicitly resistive, ignoring repeated and increasingly 
explicit hints from the TA that she needs to reframe 
the activity as an estimation problem.
20
 
In a second example using data from the current 
study, Bing and Redish
3
 observed a group of students 
in an undergraduate quantum mechanics class trying to 
evaluate an integral arising from problem 5.6 in 
Griffiths’ text, Introduction to Quantum Mechanics.
21
 
Although the problem is about the difference between 
fermions and bosons, an intermediate stage requires 
the students to evaluate the expectation value of x
2
 in a 
stationary state of the one-dimensional infinite square 
well.  The students write down the expectation value 
.  They quickly convert this largely ab-
stract representation into a more concrete one, 
, not noticing that they have incor-
rectly identified the limits on the integral.  They then 
proceed to frame the task as one of Calculation.  The 
student leading the work has many powerful tools 
available including her own skill with formal integra-
tion and her ability to use external calculation tools 
including Mathematica™ on a laptop and a symbolic 
integrator on a TI calculator.  These tools inform her 
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that the simplified integral she has chosen to work 
with, , is undefined.  Because the set of 
cognitive resources she has activated do not include 
either her physical knowledge about the problem (or, 
indeed, a graphical representation of the mathematical 
integral), she focuses on the “algorithmically follow-
ing a set of established computational steps”. She be-
comes increasingly convinced that the result is unde-
fined and that the problem is unanswerable.  It’s only 
when one of the students reframes the task more physi-
cally (“Hey, it’s not infinity to infinity…We only have 
to integrate over the square well!”) do they all realize 
(with some embarrassment) that they had just spent 
fifteen minutes trying to calculate the wrong integral. 
Our third example of “getting stuck” is taken from 
the antecedent paper to this work.
1
 In that paper, we 
discuss an example in which two students are arguing 
over the solution to a problem in a class in Intermedi-
ate Mathematical Methods.  The task was one from 
vector calculus: to evaluate a change in gravitational 
potential energy by doing the integral of the work, 
 

F dr
A
B
 , over two distinct paths.  One student recalls 
the theorem that for conservative forces the work is 
path independent and frames the task as Invoking 
Authority, citing the theorem without producing any 
further evidence despite increasing requests from the 
other discussant.  The second discussant has framed 
the task as Physical Mapping, insisting that the longer 
path must correspond to the larger integral.  The inter-
action is made more complicated by the fact that the 
first student has incorrectly written down the explica-
tion of the abstract integral in a way such that explicit 
evaluation supports the view of the second student. 
This discussion lasts for many minutes with neither 
student being willing either to accept the other stu-
dent’s warrants or to accept the other’s epistemologi-
cal framing.  Only when they succeed in negotiating a 
common epistemological frame does the discussion 
lead to an effective solution. 
These three examples all show novice and jour-
neyman students getting stuck in a particular epistemo-
logical frame.  As the main point of this paper, we 
want to now present two case studies that demonstrate 
how journeyman students are able to dynamically shift 
their epistemological frames.  We conjecture that this 
fluid epistemological frame shifting is an important 
hallmark of expertise in physics.  These examples are 
presented as “dissociations,” as examples in which the 
students show skill and flexibility in epistemological 
frame switching but in which this does not suffice to 
lead them to the correct answer.  These students all 
struggle, but they struggle in a sophisticated way.  This 
illustrates our point that the epistemological compo-
nent of expertise is independent of the correctness of a 
student’s answer. 
IV. CASE STUDY 1: FLEXIBLE FRAMINGS 
Our first case study has two physics students trying 
to agree on the best way to frame the math use at hand.  
S1 will make several framing bids.  S2 responds to 
these bids, illustrating how epistemological framing 
can be a relatively labile process as well a “sticky” 
one.  We will use our previously developed warrant 
analysis scheme
1
 to identify the epistemological fram-
ings (Calculation, Physical Mapping, Invoking 
Authority, and Mathematical Consistency). 
 
   
A. The question 
The two students in this episode are enrolled in a 
second semester undergraduate quantum mechanics 
class.  They are meeting outside of class to work on 
that week’s homework assignment.  The case study 
begins with the students part way through problem 
6.32, part b, in Griffiths’s undergraduate quantum 
text.
21
  That problem deals with the Feynman-
Hellmann theorem, , which relates 
the partial derivative of an energy eigenvalue with 
respect to any parameter  to the expectation value of 
the same partial derivative of the Hamiltonian.   
The problem tells them to consider the one-
dimensional harmonic oscillator, for which the Hamil-
tonian is 
 
H =
2
2m
2
x2 +
1
2
m 2x2  and the nth eigenvalue 
is 
 
En =  n + 12




. They are asked to set  equal to , 
, and m (the angular frequency of the oscillator, 
Planck’s constant, and the mass of the oscillator, re-
spectively) in turn and to use the Feynman-Hellmann 
theorem to get expressions for the oscillator’s kinetic 
and potential energy expectation values. 
We begin with S1 noticing an oddity.  When she 
sets 
  =  , the Feynman-Hellmann theorem requires 
her to consider 
 


.  How does one deal with a partial 
derivative with respect to a universal constant? 
B. A framing clash and a quick shift 
The two students are seated at a table throughout 
this discussion.  They do not gesture towards any dia-
grams or equations in a shared space. 
 
1. S1: If we figure this out, hopefully it’ll make the 
other ones easier.  When you say something’s a 
function of a certain parameter, doesn’t that mean 
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that as you change that parameter, the function 
changes? 
2. S2: mmm-hmm 
3. S1: OK, so I can change omega, but I can’t 
change h-bar. 
4. S2: Sure you can.  
5. S1: I can? 
6. S2: You can make it whatever you want it to be.   
7. S1: But 
8. S2: It’s a constant in real life, but it’s a funct-, it’s, 
it appears in the function and you’re welcome to 
change its value. 
9. S1: But then it doesn’t mean anything. 
10. S2: Sure it does.  Apparently it means the expecta-
tion value of [kinetic energy]. 
11. S1: You don’t really know what you’re talking 
about. 
12. S2: Look, all it is, is you’re gonna take the deriva-
tive with respect to 
13. S1: Yeah, I understand what they want me to do 
here. 
14. S2: They’re just applying the theorem. 
 
S1 begins this passage with a concise check on 
what a derivative entails.  “When you say something’s 
a function of a certain parameter, doesn’t that mean 
that as you change that parameter, the function 
changes?” (line 1).  Upon S2’s affirmation, S1 points 
out a mismatch of this mathematical point with a 
physical reality.  The parameter  is a universal physi-
cal constant.  Taking a partial derivative with respect 
to  would imply that Planck’s constant can vary.  S1 
is framing her use of mathematics as Physical Map-
ping.  Her warrant for not accepting the  operation 
focuses on how valid uses of math in physics class 
tend to align with physical reality.   
S2 initially responds to S1’s concern by asserting a 
rule.  The warrant for his counterargument concerns 
the practical, common use of statements and previous 
results without explicit justification.  “Sure you can 
[change ]” he says.  “You can make it whatever you 
want it to be” (lines 4 and 6).  In so responding, S2 is 
lobbying for an Invoking Authority framing.  He is 
suggesting S1 set aside her physically motivated ob-
jections and instead judge the validity of 
 


 according 
to his confidence in his assertions. 
S1 and S2 are arguing over something much deeper 
than whether or not one is allowed to take a partial 
derivative with respect to .  They are disagreeing over 
what would be appropriate grounds for accepting or 
rejecting such an operation.   
S1 does not accept S2’s bid for Invoking Authority.  
Upon her first protest in line 7, S2 quickly admits “it’s 
a constant in real life” (line 8) but sticks to his Invok-
ing Authority framing.  “It appears in the function and 
you’re welcome to change its value” (line 8).   
S1 protests again; “But then it doesn’t mean any-
thing” (line 9).  Such a statement’s full interpretation 
relies on acknowledging S1’s Physical Mapping fram-
ing.  In some framings, S1’s statement is patently 
false.  The operation 
 
H

 can “mean” plenty.  For ex-
ample, in a Calculation framing carrying out the opera-
tion on the Hamiltonian operator as a formal mathe-
matical calculation without any consideration of 
physical meaning would produce the operator 
 

m
2
x2
.  
The mathematical operations involved in such a com-
putation (and their formal interpretations and theoreti-
cal underpinnings) were among the crowning 
achievements of calculus’s discovery.  S2 retains his 
Invoking Authority framing and quickly responds with 
another “meaning” of 
 
H

.  Quoting from the text-
book’s statement of the homework problem, he says 
“Sure it [means something].  Apparently it means the 
expectation value of [kinetic energy]” (line 10).  The 
question had told them to set 
  =   in the Feynman-
Hellmann theorem, , and hence to 
obtain an expression for the expectation value of ki-
netic energy.  S2 is thus relying on the authority of the 
text’s question for his interpretation of 
 
H

.  Only by 
acknowledging S1’s current Physical Mapping fram-
ing can we place her claim in the proper context.  If 
one’s warrant for judging an operation like 
 
H

 con-
cerns the alignment of the mathematics with a physical 
reality, then yes, that operation can be said not to 
“mean” much of anything.  In the real physical world 
Planck’s constant has a particular value and does not 
vary.  
S1 objects to S2’s arguments again in line 11.  
“You don’t really know what you’re talking about.”  
This perturbation was sufficiently strong to cause S2 
to reframe his attempt to justify 
 


.  He says “look, 
all it is, is you’re gonna take the derivative with re-
spect to” (line 12) before getting cut off by S1.  Cou-
pled with his next statement in line 14, “they’re just 
applying the theorem,” these statements can be seen as 
an attempt to reframe his thinking as Calculation.  S2 
is suggesting they go ahead and use their calculus ma-
chinery to take the partial derivative.  As long as they 
stay true to the rules of calculus, they should be able to 
trust whatever result appears.   
S1 acknowledges this attempt to reframe their work 
as Calculation.  “Yeah, I understand what they want 
me to do here” (line 13).  Lines 12 to 14 nicely illus-
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trate how efficient this implicit epistemic frame nego-
tiation can be.  These lines didn’t even take five sec-
onds to speak.  In those five seconds, S2 made a call 
for using a different set of warrants.  S1 heard that call 
and her brain quickly activated some of the procedures 
and techniques that would be associated with such a 
framing, as evidenced by “yeah, I understand what 
they want me to do here” (line 13).  S2, just as quickly, 
acknowledges S1’s acknowledgment of his reframing 
suggestion with his “they’re just applying the theo-
rem” (line 14). 
C. Another quick shift, this time  
to a shared physical mapping framing 
S1 still insists on a justification more in line with 
her Physical Mapping framing.  She begins the next 
chunk of transcript with another reframing objection.  
S2 responds by nimbly dropping his Calculation fram-
ing and adopting Physical Mapping himself.  
 
15. S1: But I don’t understand how you can take 
the derivative with respect to a constant.  
16. S2: Because if you change the constant then 
the function will change. 
17. S1: But then it’s not, it’s not physics. 
18. S2: So?  Actually it is, ‘cause, you know, a lot 
of constants aren’t completely determined. 
19. S1: There’s still only one value for it, that’s 
what a constant is. 
20. S2: The Hubble constant changes.  The Hubble 
constant changes as we improve our under-
standing of the rate of expansion of the uni-
verse, and we use the Hubble constant in equa-
tions.  
21. S1: But there’s only one, right, there’s only 
one constant.  It does not vary. 
22. S2: Yeah, but the value’s changing as we ap-
proach the correct answer. 
23. S1: It’s just gonna get fixed.  That’s not, that’s 
not helping us with the derivative. 
24. S2: You can always take a derivative with re-
spect to anything. 
25. S1: But if you take it with respect to a con-
stant, you’ll get zero. 
26. S2: Not if the constant itself appears in it. The 
derivative tells you if you change whatever 
you’re taking the derivative with respect to 
how will the function change? 
 
S1 begins this block of transcript by repeating her 
discomfort with 
 


 (line 15).  S2 responds with “be-
cause if you change the constant then the function will 
change” (line 16).  This statement does not clearly 
align with only one of this paper’s common framings.  
Its ambiguity comes in large part from its isolation.  
Perhaps it was a prelude to a calculation explanation, 
or perhaps S2 was preparing to use some sort of Math 
Consistency warrant as he related this 

 issue to a 
more familiar Calculus 101 example.  S2’s thought 
could have evolved this way or that, but one cannot 
assume line 16, by itself, was necessarily the tip of an 
implicit iceberg of coherence.    
S1’s next objection, “but then it’s not, it’s not 
physics,” (line 17) leads S2 to start explicitly searching 
for an example of a physical constant that varies.  In 
undertaking such a search, S2 has adopted the framing 
S1 has been pushing.  Valid use of math in physics 
class should align with physical reality.  S2 hopes that 
by finding an example of a varying physical constant 
he can convince S1 that it is permissible to take a de-
rivative with respect to Planck’s constant.  S2 frames 
his activity as physical mapping starting in line 18.  
S2 invokes the analogy of the Hubble constant in 
lines 18 to 22.  The Hubble constant is connected to 
the rate of expansion of the universe.  S2 points out 
that the value of the Hubble constant quoted by scien-
tists has changed over the past half a century as our 
measurement techniques have improved.  He argues 
that the Hubble constant, variable as it seems, is an 
important part of many physics equations.  By exten-
sion, it should be permissible to consider a varying 
Planck’s constant. 
S1 offers a much richer response to S2’s Hubble 
constant argument than she has to any of his other at-
tempts in this episode.  Up to this point, she had been 
simply shooting down S2 with comments like “but 
then it doesn’t mean anything” (line 9), “you don’t 
really know what you’re talking about” (line 11), and 
“but then it’s not, it’s not physics” (line 17).  S2’s 
Hubble constant argument marked the first time he 
adopted S1’s warrant concerning the alignment of 
math and physics, i.e. the first time he and S1 shared a 
common epistemological framing.   
This shared epistemological framing helps S1 en-
gage with S2’s chosen example in lines 21 to 23, and 
she points out that he’s confusing a measurement vari-
ance with an actual physical variance.  Sure, she says, 
our quoted value for the Hubble constant has shifted as 
our measurements improve, but presumably our meas-
urements are tending towards a fixed value.  The Hub-
ble constant itself, she says, isn’t changing.  “That’s 
not helping us with the derivative” (line 23). 
This counterargument causes S2 to reframe the 
situation once again as he turns to a different type of 
justification.  He quotes a rule again in line 24.  “You 
can always take a derivative with respect to anything.”  
S1 misspeaks when she replies.  “But if you take it 
with respect to a constant, you’ll get zero” (line 25).  
This statement seems to confuse her earlier correct 
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interpretation of 
 


 (as in line 1) with the Calculus 
101 mantra “the derivative of a constant is zero”, i.e. 
 

x = 0
.  S1 responds to this misstatement in line 26. 
D. A Final Frame Shift 
The final block of transcript from this episode fol-
lows S2’s quick correction.  It begins with S1 object-
ing yet again and S2 trying out yet another framing.  
 
27. S1: So I don’t understand how you can 
change a constant. 
28. S2: You pretend like it’s not a constant.  It’s 
just like when you take partial derivatives 
with respect to, like variables in a function of 
multivariables.  You pretend that the vari-
ables are constant. 
29. S1: Yeah, I don’t have a problem with that. 
30. S2: You’re going the other way now.  You’re 
pretending a constant is a variable.  Who 
cares? 
31. S1: It doesn’t make sense to me. 
32. S2: You can easily change a variable—it’s 
not supposed to, I don’t think.   
33. S1: OK, then I believe- 
34. S2: I don’t think, I don’t think there’s sup-
posed to be any great meaning behind why 
we get the change h-bar.  I think it just-
they’re like oh look, if you do it and you take 
its derivative and you use this equation, then 
all of a sudden you get some expectation of 
[kinetic energy], and you say whooptie-
freekin-do. 
 
S2 responds to S1’s latest objection in line 27 via a 
Math Consistency framing.  His newest argument re-
lies on a warrant he hasn’t yet tried:  mathematics is a 
self-consistent field of knowledge, so a valid mathe-
matical argument is one that fits in logically with other 
mathematical ideas.   
S2 makes a common move for a Math Consistency 
framing.  He draws an analogy in lines 28 to 30.  In 
order to take a derivative with respect to , one has to 
“pretend” that the constant is a variable.  S2 points out 
that taking a standard partial derivative with respect to 
one of the variables of a multivariable function in-
volves “pretending” the other variables are constants.  
Their 

 case, he argues, is “just like” that analogous 
example, except “you’re going the other way now.  
You’re pretending a constant is a variable.” 
In contrast to her more extended counterargument 
in the Hubble constant case, S1 rejects this present 
argument much more coarsely.  “It doesn’t make sense 
to me” (line 31).  S2 has once again framed their work 
differently than S1’s Physical Mapping.  A plausible 
explanation is that each student’s mind has activated a 
sufficiently different subset of their available mathe-
matical resources, and that restricts the depth of their 
communication and interaction.     
When S2 responds “it’s not supposed to [make 
sense], I don’t think” in line 32, he is explicitly 
addressing S1’s Physical Mapping framing for the first 
time.  While he had been responsive to her objections 
throughout this episode, he now argues with her epis-
temological framing directly.  He states that he doesn’t 
think an explanation of the type S1 seeks exists.  S1 is 
possibly about to acknowledge inappropriateness of 
the Physical Mapping stance when she replies “OK, 
then I believe-” (line 33), but she gets cut off.  S2 then 
elaborates a hybrid of Calculation and Invoking 
Authority that he sees as most appropriate in line 34.  
Mechanically take the derivative with respect to , 
following the familiar calculation algorithms, and then 
trust the Feynman-Hellmann theorem to relate this 
derivative to the oscillator’s kinetic energy. 
E. Implications of the first case study 
This case study illustrates how epistemological 
framing can be a relatively flexible process.  The en-
tire episode is essentially many iterations of S1 object-
ing and S2 saying, “Well, all right, how about this 
other type of explanation?”  S1’s objections serve as 
perturbations to S2’s mental state.  Many of them are 
of sufficient strength (or occur after he has reached a 
respectable closure point of his previous argument) to 
lead him to reframe his thinking.  Each reframing re-
sults in S2 adopting a different type of warrant for 
judging the validity of his mathematical claim, that 
one should accept the operation 
 


 as legitimate 
within physics, despite the constancy of .  
This 

 issue is a relatively difficult one.  Ordinar-
ily, a physical mapping frame is quite valuable in 
physics.  Helping students understand the physical 
referents of their math is a common, if sometimes dif-
ficult, goal of many physics classes.  But the situation 
here does not have such a direct physical interpreta-
tion.  Instead, what the user of the theorem is being 
asked to do is consider an imaginary world, one where 
 can have a different value, and to see how comparing 
the value in our world to the one in this imaginary 
world can inform us.  This kind of “breaking the ex-
pected frame” has led to many valuable results in 
physics, one of the most dramatic being the Bardeen-
Cooper-Schrieffer explanation of the superconducting 
state.  In this model, one of our strongest assumptions 
– the superselection rule that the number of leptons 
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remains fixed – is freely violated and a state is created 
that contains different numbers of electrons with dif-
ferent probabilities.   
That S1 and S2 were willing to engage in an explo-
ration of the sophisticated epistemological issues that 
are implicitly involved with understanding how to 
frame the meaning of 
 


 is commendable, even if the 
episode ends without an especially satisfying consen-
sus.  These students were indeed struggling, but they 
were struggling in an expert-like way when their 
thinking is viewed through an epistemological lens. 
  V. CASE STUDY 2:  FLEXIBLE FRAM-
INGS AND SEEKING COHERENCE 
Our second example comes from a strong nontradi-
tional student who had enrolled in our fourth-semester 
class in Intermediate Mathematical Methods at the 
beginning of the semester.  This student already held 
an undergraduate science degree and had spent several 
years in the workplace before returning to the univer-
sity to study for another degree.  Upon attending the 
first several classes, he discovered that he was already 
familiar with most of the class’s content.  He decided 
to look for an option to place out of the class, which 
was technically required for his major.  As part of the 
agreement reached, he took that semester’s final exam 
some months after the course ended.  When the stu-
dent sat for the problem-solving interview from which 
the data below is taken, he had already taken the exam 
but hadn’t yet seen how it was scored.   
In the interview, the student was given a blank 
copy of one of the exam problems he had worked on a 
few days earlier.  This problem dealt with three-
dimensional vector calculus and was designed with an 
eye towards the analogous Continuity Equation the 
students would soon encounter in their Electricity and 
Magnetism class.  It read:  
  
In class, we derived the integral relationship 
that expresses the conservation of matter of a 
fluid:  
 
 d
dt
d

 = v( ) d A

 .  Suppose that  
describes the concentration in a solvent of a 
chemical compound that can be created or de-
stroyed by chemical reactions.  Suppose also 
that the rate of creation (or destruction) of the 
compound per unit volume as a function of po-
sition at the point  

r  at a time t is given by 
 
Q

r ,t( ) .  The quantity Q is defined to be posi-
tive when the compound is being created, 
negative when it is being destroyed.  How 
would the equation above have to be modi-
fied?  Explain. 
 
One good way to begin this problem would be to 
do a dimensional analysis.  Both the terms  
and v( ) d A

  have dimensions of amount of com-
pound divided by time.  The creation rate Q is already 
a rate, so there shouldn’t be an additional time deriva-
tive involved.  Integrating Q (which is a concentration 
as well) over the volume would give a dimensionally 
consistent third term for the equation: .  What 
relative sign should be given to this third term?  One 
way to find out would be to consider the case where 
there is a source of the chemical inside the volume (so 
Q > 0 by the problem’s definition), but the amount of 
the chemical in the volume (i.e. ) is not changing 
in time (so  = 0).  Some amount of chemical 
must then be flowing out of the volume, so 
 
v( ) d A

  
is positive.  Thus, the Q term can go on the left side 
with a positive sign:  
 
Qd

  ddt d = 

v( ) dA

 . 
This problem was thus intended to require a mix-
ture of physical and mathematical reasoning. 
At the point where the discussion picks up, Student 
3 (S3) has already read through the problem and cop-
ied the main equation, 
 
 d
dt
d

 = v( ) d A

 , onto the 
blackboard and added a Q term to the equation giving  
 
Q

r ,t( )  d
dt
d

 = v( ) d A

  
although he is not yet sure of that term’s proper sign.  
He is not yet aware of the dimensional inconsistency 
of the way he included this Q term.  He has also al-
ready drawn a sketch showing an outflow of chemical 
from a region of space, to which he will refer in the 
upcoming transcript: 
 
1. S3: yeah the one thing I was confused about on 
the exam and I continue to be confused about it 
now, is the sign of this here,  
                      writes “+/-” in front of Q 
like whether this is going to be a plus or a minus 
because, rate of creation, so if it’s getting created, 
and then it’s-Yeah, I’m not sure about this one, 
about this sign. 
2. Interviewer:  OK, so if, let’s say you pick the 
positive sign 
3. S3: Right. 
4. I: OK?   
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5. S3: Yeah. 
6. I:  What does that then entail, that you could go 
check, try to check if it’s right or wrong? 
7. S3: Uhhh, yeah, if it’s a, if it’s a positive sign then 
the right hand side has to increase 
                points to 
 
v( ) d A

  
because something is getting 
sourced inside this volume.  So 
for this to increase- 
              points to picture:  
8. Yeah, so it cannot be a positive, it has to be a 
negative, because then that’s going to increase- 
for these signs to match, for the magnitude to in-
crease, 
      points to signs in front of ±Q and  
like these signs have to match,                           
                Erases “±” and writes “-Q” 
so it’s probably negative.  
9. Although on the other hand, when I think of a 
source I think of a positive sign and sink is a 
negative sign.  Yeah so that’s where my confusion 
lies. 
 
This clip begins with S3 acknowledging his confu-
sion over the sign of the Q term.  Lines 1 have him 
putting a “±” notation next the Q in his equation and 
noting how he wasn’t particularly sure how to handle 
this issue several days before on the exam itself.  The 
interviewer wanted to see how S3 would address this 
confusion, so he prompted S3 with a guess-and-check 
strategy.  “Let’s say you pick the positive sign…What 
does that entail, that you go check?”  It so happens that 
the interviewer suggests the correct answer.  Q should 
be positive, given the side of the equation on which S3 
wrote it. 
The noteworthy part of this clip concerns how S3 
responds to the interviewer’s suggestion.  S3 tries to 
frame the question in several different ways, trying 
different mathematical warrants with each framing.  
He doesn’t disregard the previous framings’ results but 
instead looks for consistency among the answers he 
gets with these different framings.  His confusion on 
the sign of Q persists, but it persists because he can’t 
align the results his various framings.  S3 (like S1 and 
S2) is confused, but again in an epistemologically so-
phisticated way. 
S3 can be said to exhibit an overarching framing, 
one that values coherency among multiple lines of 
reasoning.  Physical Mapping, Calculation, and Invok-
ing Authority can be seen as subframes nested within 
this larger coherency-valuing framing. 
S3 begins with a Physical Mapping framing in line 
7.  He argues that if there is a source of the chemical 
inside the volume (i.e. if Q is positive) “then the right 
hand side has to increase because something is getting 
sources inside this volume.”  He had previously spent 
(before the quoted transcript) nearly a minute describ-
ing how 
 
v( ) d A

  represented a flux, an outflow of 
chemical from the volume.  S3 is arguing that if there 
is a source of the chemical inside the volume, then 
you’d physically expect more to flow out of the vol-
ume.  He juxtaposes a mathematical expression (when 
he points to v( ) d A

 ) with a diagram-aided physical 
observation of more material flowing out of the vol-
ume. 
S3 makes an expert-like move when he then turns 
to another type of argument to hopefully support the 
positive-Q conclusion of his Physical Mapping.  His 
reframing is not complete.  S3 is not about to simply 
disregard his previous reasoning in a Physical Map-
ping framing.  He keeps his answer from the Physical 
Mapping framing (Q should be positive) on hold to 
compare with what his upcoming Calculation argu-
ment will give.  Line 8 has him quickly reframing the 
problem as Calculation.  He shifts his focus to the 
arithmetic signs in front of the various terms in his 
equation: 
 
±Q

r ,t( )  d
dt
d

 = v( ) d A

 .  He notes that 
computationally, a positive sign in front of the Q and a 
negative sign in front of the  won’t have the 
same effect with regards to increasing the 
 
v( ) d A

  on 
the right side.  “For these signs to match, for the mag-
nitude to increase, like these signs have to match, so 
[Q] is probably negative.”  A negative and a negative 
will “match” and can work together to change the 
value of the right hand side.   
S3’s expertise does not lie in the argument he con-
structs in his Calculation framing.  Technically, his 
argument is flawed.  A positive Q will increase the 
total value of the equation’s left side regardless of the 
negative sign in front of the  term.  S3’s ex-
pertise lies in the fact that he looked to Calculation in 
addition to Physical Mapping.  He is framing the ques-
tion in different ways, nesting these framings within a 
larger search for coherency.  Unfortunately, his two 
framings have produced opposite answers, so he tries a 
third approach. 
Lines 23 to 25 have S3 reframing his work again, 
this time as Invoking Authority.  He quickly recalls a 
common convention in physics (and one quoted in the 
problem itself).  “Although on the other hand, when I 
think of a source I think of a positive sign and sink is a 
negative sign”.  This line of reasoning would put a 
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positive sign in front of Q, contradicting the result 
from his Calculation framing.  Still unable to find a 
satisfactory coherence among his arguments, S3 fin-
ishes with “yeah, so that’s where my confusion lies.” 
This example, like the first case study, demon-
strates an important component of expertise that an 
epistemic framing analysis can especially bring to the 
fore.  On the one hand, S3 isn’t showing much sophis-
tication.  He hasn’t answered the question of the sign 
of Q, after all.  On the other hand, S3 is demonstrating 
a very impressive component of expertise among 
physicists.  He is approaching the problem from sev-
eral different angles, trying out several different types 
of arguments.  He is confused because he is searching 
for coherence among these different arguments, and he 
isn’t finding it.  Nonetheless, he is implicitly valuing 
this coherency.  An epistemic framing analysis helps 
bring out this important component of his expertise. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR INSTRUCTION 
There are two main threads of research on expertise 
in physics and math problem solving. First, experts 
have larger and better-organized banks of knowledge. 
Second, experts are better in-the-moment navigators 
during the problem solving process. Since none of the 
students in our case studies come to an especially sat-
isfying final answer, it could be said that their knowl-
edge banks are failing them.  
However, the journeyman students in these case 
studies display a hallmark of expertise that the stu-
dents stuck in particular epistemological framings in 
our previous papers
1,2,3
 did not (at least in these given 
episodes). They fluidly frame their math use in differ-
ent ways, either working hard to decide which is most 
appropriate (like S1 and S2) or looking for consistency 
across the different arguments their reframings pro-
duce (like S3). They display a larger, overarching 
framing that values this sensibility and coherency, and 
they can hence nest Calculation, Physical Mapping, 
Invoking Authority, and Math Consistency within it. 
The students in our previous papers display a stubborn 
commitment to a single frame, even in the face of re-
framing bids or opportunities. This epistemic framing 
analysis tool used here provides a lens for investigat-
ing the in-the-moment navigation component of exper-
tise in physics problem solving. An overarching fram-
ing that values coherency among different lines of 
reasoning is an important component of expertise, one 
that can be discussed independent of the strict correct-
ness or incorrectness of students’ reasoning—an im-
portant message for both physics instructors and phys-
ics education researchers.  
Our four simple epistemological resources and the 
associated framings that concentrate on a single one of 
these resources were drawn from data with novice and 
journeyman students.  The development of expertise in 
physics problem solving lies well beyond any single 
one of these four.  Expert problem solvers should have 
a broader, more inclusive epistemological framing in 
which all of these resources can be used together. 
Therefore, students’ reasoning should be judged by 
richer and more sophisticated criteria than a simple 
labeling of their answers as correct or incorrect or even 
by evaluating their mathematical skills. Framing con-
siderations can add considerable depth to a teacher’s 
evaluation of her student’s thinking.  Are the students 
only framing their activity in one way, or are they 
making an effort to approach the problem with several 
different framings? Are they valuing coherency among 
the different arguments they produce for the same 
problem? Even some incorrect student answers are 
very sophisticated from this multiple framing view-
point, like the examples in our case studies. As teach-
ers, we should make a special point both of explicitly 
modeling this search for coherency among framings 
for our students and seeing value when our students do 
it, whether they immediately get the correct answer or 
not.  
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